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INTRODUCTION 
In the foreword to “‘Law As . . .’ Glossolalia,” Chris Tomlins frames the 
central topic of the symposium in terms of jurisprudence and the practice of history 
writing. History writing, he argues, enables scholars to rearticulate different aspects 
of the ideas, practices, and institutions of law. Considering glossolalia—speaking in 
tongues and the expression of divine spirit—suggests Tomlins, might allow us to 
say something about contemporary forms of jurisprudence and history writing or, 
at least about those genres that remain in touch with the common law tradition.1 
This Afterword follows up the projects presented in the “Law As . . .” 
symposium as if they articulate a series of jurisprudences that offer a training in the 
conduct of office or persona of the (minor) jurisprudent. A jurisprudent, here, can 
be characterised as someone who develops a persona or takes up an office, which 
cares for the conduct of lawful relations or ways of belonging to law. The training 
in conduct addressed here is linked—via glossolalia and “speaking in tongues”—to 
the “government of the tongue” and forms of eloquence. Drawing on Chris 
Tomlins’s foreword to this symposium, this Afterword wonders too about the 
 
* Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne. The comments on office and conduct presented 
here have been developed in collaboration over many years with Shaunnagh Dorsett, Law School, 
University of Technology Sydney; and Ann Genovese, Melbourne Law School, University of 
Melbourne. 
1. See Christopher Tomlins, Foreword. “Law As . . .” III—Glossolalia: Toward a Minor (Historical) 
Jurisprudence, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 239 (2015). 
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training in conduct offered when forms of history writing become forms of minor 
jurisprudence and a guide to a conduct of lawful life (or a life lived with law). The 
“government of the tongue” here becomes not an argument about state-managed 
free speech or censorship but the art of speaking well and of living with law and 
justice. 
I. OFFICE AND CONDUCT 
Restoring or assigning an office to the jurisprudent today is, perhaps, a little 
optimistic. The language and the institutional life of office have for a long time 
provided a point of engagement of public life, but they are rarely treated as capable 
of generating obligations or distinct styles of conduct or action.2 Some offices, like 
those of state (judge, legislator, governor, soldier), church (bishop, priest), and other 
public and private corporations, are instituted in formal ways, still often bound by 
oath to a higher authority. These offices mark the duties, responsibilities, rights, and 
privileges that are taken up in public life. There are other offices, like those of 
doctor, engineer, philosopher, poet, artist, or critic, that used to be treated as social 
or intellectual offices. Today, they might be viewed in terms of vocation, profession, 
or career. In these offices, if they are still such, it is more likely that evaluative work 
be assigned to general accounts of normative theory and social management. Office, 
I think, remains both a central concern of public life and a distinct mode of 
organising participation in public life. 
Within the university, we live and use the language of office but mostly in the 
context of administrative office and material place. The scholar, historian, jurist, 
and jurisprudent might well benefit from being returned to an office that has 
purpose (justice and the conduct of a lawful life), a mode and manner of 
performance, and evaluation of its virtues and vices. The duties, responsibilities, and 
privileges of the scholar are varied and carried in the languages of religious calling, 
state education, and commercial activity. The same can be said for the jurisprudent 
as an officeholder or person who cares for the conduct of lawful relations.3 How 
the obligations of office are understood depends in large part on the authority under 
which it is created. The civil authority of the state has shaped office in relation to 
forms of nontranscendent authority, desacralised political association, a plurality of 
forms of duty, and modes of engaging and creating public life. The authority of the 
Christian church has shaped office around liturgy and the ceremonial imitation of 
the life of Christ.4 The theologies and jurisprudences that inform such offices and 
forms of association have been engaged in the formation and transmission of the 
 
2. ANDREW SABL, RULING PASSIONS: POLITICAL OFFICES AND DEMOCRATIC ETHICS 
(2002). 
3. PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER MINOR 
JURISPRUDENCES (1996); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: 
CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1987). 
4. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, OPUS DEI: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF DUTY (Adam Kotsko trans., 
Stanford Univ. Press 2013) (2012). 
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Catholic Church and the creation and realignment of political and moral authority 
with the West.5 Minor jurisprudents take up office, if at all, in other places or other 
ways. Like the work of feminist jurisprudents directed towards creating new 
personae for public and private life, the minor jurisprudent may also be engaged in 
crafting new juridical personae capable of acting within and without office.6 
One link that becomes clearer in joining the conduct of office to 
jurisprudential writing is that jurisprudence is joined more directly to Greek, Roman, 
and Christian traditions of philosophy that respond to the question, “How should 
I conduct a life?” As the historian and philosopher Pierre Hadot has argued, such 
responses have been ordered around an induction into the “philosophical life” and 
conducted, in large part, through the practice of spiritual exercises.7 Such exercises 
were directed to creating and transforming not just the self and a vision of the world 
but ways of living and acting in the world.8 At the centre of Hadot’s account of the 
classical traditions of philosophy is the teaching offered by the philosopher to the 
pupil.9 Philosophy, as Montaigne relates, is not simply a preparation for death, it is 
a “continual exercise of the soul,” or an exercise of judgement.10 The importance 
of philosophy in this account is practical insofar as it assists the living of a 
philosophical life. Such assistance might be thought of in terms of an ensemble of 
arts, techniques, and cultivation of forms of intellectual and juridical life. This 
includes the art of writing as well as reflection.11 
 
5. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION (1983). 
6. EDWARD MUSSAWIR, JURISDICTION IN DELEUZE: THE EXPRESSION AND 
REPRESENTATION OF LAW (2011); Ann Genovese, Inheriting and Inhabiting the Pleasures and Duties of Our 
Own Existence: The Second Sex and Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 41 (2013). 
7. See PIERRE HADOT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES FROM 
SOCRATES TO FOUCAULT 264–74 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Michael Chase trans., 1995) [hereinafter 
HADOT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE]; PIERRE HADOT, WHAT IS ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY? 253–
70 (Michael Chase trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2002) (1995) [hereinafter HADOT, WHAT IS ANCIENT 
PHILOSOPHY?]. Hadot characterises these spiritual exercises in terms of a “way of life,” Foucault’s re-
formulation through a range of texts is “care of the self.” Here, the term “conduct of life” is used to tie 
philosophical exercises in with the exercises of persona required to occupy office or public life. With due 
recognition of the difficulties of naming any such tradition, the continuing engagement of “spiritual 
exercises” and the formulation of might be labelled, for now, as a “conduct of life tradition.” For a 
fuller discussion, see Genovese, supra note 6, and Ann Genovese & Shaun McVeigh, Nineteen Eight 
Three: A Jurisographic Report on Tasmania v Commonwealth, GRIFFITH LAW REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2015.1022891. 
8. For an account that gives more emphasis to the commitment to reason, see JOHN M. 
COOPER, PURSUITS OF WISDOM: SIX WAYS OF LIFE IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY FROM SOCRATES TO 
PLOTINUS 18–20 (2012). See also JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF (2005). 
9. See HADOT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE, supra note 7, at 56–65. 
10. Pierre Force, Montaigne and the Coherence of Eclecticism, 70 J. HIST. IDEAS, 523, 529 (2009) 
(citing MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Pedantry, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE: ESSAYS, 
TRAVEL JOURNAL, LETTERS 125 (Donald Frame ed. & trans., 1958)). 
11. HADOT, WHAT IS ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY?, supra note 7, at 22–34 (discussing forms of life). 
Foucault characterises the formation of the self both in terms of “care of the self” and the writing of 
the self. Michel Foucault, Writing the Self (1983), reprinted in FOUCAULT AND HIS INTERLOCUTORS 234, 
238 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Ann Hobart trans., 1997). 
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In Roman and then Renaissance and early modern thought in Europe, such 
exercises, practices, and arts were turned to the training in the conduct and practice 
of office. In addition to discharging the duties of office, the holder of an office 
offers training, to self and others, in how to form an official life. Considered as a 
training in conduct, a central question of the contemporary office of jurisprudent 
can be cast as “how can I (or others) conduct a lawful life?” The response, from 
within jurisprudence traditions, has not always been expressed in terms either of 
“spiritual” or “worldly” exercises, but a significant part of the tradition has done 
so.12 
One important site for the development of the persona of the jurisprudent lies 
with the cultivation of “eloquence.” Most visibly marked through Renaissance legal 
humanist scholarship, the Ciceronian elevation of eloquence and persuasion in the 
studia humanitatis has provided an important model of the scholar-jurisprudent’s 
engagement with forms of office and public life. If dignity (and later, decorum) were 
related to the obligations of office, then eloquence in its various forms directs 
attention to the persona.13 Humanist eloquence (elocutio) and its rhetorically inflected 
ethics provided the forms of propriety, ritual, and ceremony that carried the conduct 
of office.14 Eloquence might have been treated as a matter of persuasion, but it was 
also the means by which the good life was instituted and transmitted. For humanist 
scholars such as Alciatus, elocutio set the humanist scholar apart from dignity and 
office. It also opened the site and means of training that give shape to conduct and 
set office and its limits in place.15 It also gave the jurisprudent and justice their 
character. Within the legal humanist tradition, it was eloquence that determined 
conduct and set the limits of office. 
The jurisprudence of legal humanists and the elevation of eloquence beyond 
office have hardly been passed down uncontested. The exegetical and interpretative 
practices of the Roman law glossators and exegetes established a discipline or 
training in conduct that has formed the basis of modern civil law legal science and 
the office of the modern jurist.16 The early modern civil jurisprudents, for example, 
cast the plural offices of public life under a single civil authority.17 Their work drew 
 
12. DONALD R. KELLEY, RENAISSANCE HUMANISM (1991); see also Shaunnagh Dorsett & 
Shaun McVeigh, The Persona of the Jurist in Salmond’s Jurisprudence: On the Exposition of ‘What Law Is . . . ,’ 
38 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 771 (2007). 
13. This paragraph draws on the work of Piyel Haldar in Piyel Haldar, The Tongue and the Eye: 
Eloquence and the Language of Office in Some Renaissance Emblems, in GENEALOGIES OF LEGAL VISION 152 
(Peter Goodrich & Valérie Hayaert eds., forthcoming July 2015). See also Jeffrey Minson, In the Office of 
Humanity, 14 CROMOHS 1 (2009) (reviewing STÉPHANE TOUSSAINT, HUMANISMES 
ANTIHUMANISMES, I, HUMANITAS ET RENTABILITÉ DE FICINE À HEIDEGGER (2008) (Fr.)), available 
at http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/14_2009/minson_toussaint.html. 
14. Peter Goodrich, Rhetoric as Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the Politics of Legal Language 4 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 88 (1984). 
15. Haldar, supra note 13; see also Robert W. Cape Jr. Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice 
at Rome, in PRUDENCE: CLASSICAL VIRTUES, POSTMODERN PRACTICE 35 (Robert Hariman ed., 2003). 
16. BERMAN, supra note 5. 
17. IAN HUNTER, RIVAL ENLIGHTENMENTS: CIVIL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY IN 
EARLY MODERN GERMANY (2001). 
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on a variety of styles of juristic thinking as well as police science and a reformed 
protestant natural law in order to establish a training in the service of the state. In 
light of such strong accounts of office and jurisprudence, revivals of humanist legal 
scholarship have often struggled to establish forms of authority sufficient to address 
their chosen forms of lawful life.18 However, the open-ended invitation of the “Law 
As . . .” symposia to pursue ways of bringing life to law (if not always law to life) is 
one that can be recognised in many of the formulae of a historically inflected legal 
humanism. 
II. PHILOSOPHY AS TRAINING IN LIFE,  
JURISPRUDENCE AS A TRAINING IN OFFICE 
One question, then, that might be asked is “what account of training in 
conduct of jurisprudents (as university scholars) involved a training in conduct 
moving from ‘Law and . . .’ to ‘Law as . . .’”? What I want to do here is note first 
that a large number of contributors to the “Law As . . .” symposia have addressed 
the issues of training in conduct, although not necessarily as the central topic of 
their research. The differences of genre, style of argument, and subject matter make 
it difficult to make any typological generalisation about training in conduct offered 
in ways of living with law. I want first to recast Chris Tomlins’s introductory 
comments on minor jurisprudence as a training and then address some specific 
practices presented in “‘Law As . . .’ Glossolalia.” 
In his brief account of minor jurisprudences, Tomlins draws out two modes 
of engagement with the minor jurisprudence.19 One, drawing on the work of Panu 
Minkkinen, emphasises a philosophy of law that takes as its central concern the 
relation between Being and right (correctness); these concerns are linked to the end 
of philosophy and justice. The other, represented in the work of Peter Goodrich, is 
characterised in terms of the social criticism of the institutions of law and, it might 
be added, the engagement of law as the social bond.20 
Minkkinen’s philosopher (inducted through the study of the Greek and 
German philosophical canon) shapes questions of philosophy around man’s 
relation to Being or to the world, subject to a unifying philosophical reflection. The 
task of the philosopher is one of attunement to the experience of the authenticity 
and inauthenticity of being and the transformative event that breaks through the 
conditions of experience (hence, the interest in interpreting Kafka’s writing as 
somehow beyond all genres of literature and law). In his central formulations, 
Minkkinen articulates Being as desire that “reaches out” toward a something (or a 
nothing) that is non-appropriable.21 The question of law (or jurisprudence) arises in 
 
18. JEFFREY MINSON, QUESTIONS OF CONDUCT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT, CITIZENSHIP, 
GOVERNMENT (1993). 
19. Tomlins, supra note 1, at 241, 246. 
20. PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW (1995). 
21. PANU MINKKINEN, THINKING WITHOUT DESIRE: A FIRST PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3 
(1999). 
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the response to the non-appropriable, in the fall from contemplation into practical 
reasoning: correctness. If the “‘true’ thing” cannot be attained, as Minkkinen writes: 
“it might as well be ‘correct’” or, in sociopolitical terms, right.22 The training in 
remaining sensitive to the “thrownness of man” and the cultivation of a disposition 
to treat justice aporetically, is hermeneutic and recognisably part of a tradition of 
“spiritual exercise” (one writes to learn the correct relationship to justice or to 
correct others). One corollary of this way of engaging the way of life of the 
philosopher might be that to be a good jurist or lawyer, it is first necessary to be a 
good philosopher. The search for justice can be a spiritual exercise.23 
Tomlins and Minkkinen worry that Peter Goodrich’s approach to law is 
insufficiently, incorrectly, metaphysical.24 While Goodrich and Minkinnen share a 
number of sources of instruction (Lacan and Nietzsche), Goodrich, however, does 
not model the persona of the jurist on the philosopher but on the seventeenth 
century humanist scholar. Goodrich’s training in conduct proceeds not by reading 
the philosophical tradition but through a more diffuse account of humanist 
erudition and eloquence.25 While Goodrich shares with Minkkinen a sense that the 
induction into a lawful life is to be framed in terms of conducting yourself in relation 
to Being and a relationship to justice, what is more interesting to Goodrich is to 
pose that training in terms of a common law tradition of rhetoric, casuistry, 
emblematics, and philology rather than Roman and German legal science. Whether 
a rhetorician-jurisprudent can be inducted into a philosophical life, or whether he 
or she would want to be inducted into one, has long been a matter of dispute. 
Aside from an induction into different legal traditions, perhaps a difference in 
training can be found in the projects that Minkkinen and Goodrich establish for 
students. Both Minkkinen and Goodrich find the life of the jurist lacking and, in 
many respects, poorly conducted. They both argue that one reason for this is that 
critical jurists and jurisprudents cannot sort out their relationship to law. For 
Minkkinen, drawing on Max Weber, one solution depends on how the jurist lives 
with the twin restrictions of limited opportunities of delivering solutions to social 
and political problems and limited ways of occupying their office.26 These limits are 
to be met with Nietzschean affirmation. For Goodrich the issue is more one of 
training oneself and other jurisprudents to occupy, or reoccupy, an expanded office 
of the scholar. This task, as it happens, should also be met with the same 
 
22. Id. 
23. See PIERRE HADOT, THE PRESENT ALONE IS OUR HAPPINESS: CONVERSATIONS WITH 
JEANNIE CARLIER AND ARNOLD I. DAVIDSON 109 (Marc Djaballah & Michael Chase trans., 2011). 
24. See Tomlins, supra note 1, at 241. 
25. See PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL EMBLEMS AND THE ART OF LAW: OBITER DEPICTA AS 
THE VISION OF GOVERNANCE (2014). 
26. Panu Minkkinen, The Legal Academic of Max Weber’s Tragic Modernity, 19 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 
165 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423442 (drawing Heidegger and Weber into 
alignment in asking the question: how do we act responsibly in according with the form of life (office) 
that we are in?). 
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Nietzschean commitment as Minkkinen’s office holder. (Nietzsche himself 
occupied the office of university scholar with ambivalence.)27 
For many of the contributors to the “Law As . . .” symposia, the resources for 
the cultivation of the persona of the scholar and of the means of occupying the 
office of jurisprudent and/or humanist scholar are best met by drawing on 
traditions of Greek metaphysics inherited through nineteenth and twentieth century 
French and German philosophy. Minor jurisprudences, it has been suggested here, 
can also be understood as taking up an inheritance of a training in a form of life.28 
Recognition of this inheritance and its ways of life does not put an end to questions 
of the responsibility of office or the conduct of a lawful life.29 
III. “JURISPRUDENCE AS . . .” EXERCISE 
It is clearly the case that along with the training in conduct offered by Kantian 
and Neo-Kantian thought, versions of Heideggerian training in conduct have been 
significant and influential in the faculties of humanities and law in America, Europe, 
and elsewhere.30 However, these are not the only genres of training in conduct of 
office that are available or addressed in the “Law As . . .” symposia. I would like to 
address, briefly, some of these accounts. 
Pierre Hadot has remarked that while Ludwig Wittgenstein was not a historian, 
it was his account of language games and the links he made between logic and 
mystical experience (the experience of wonder before the existence of the world) 
that allowed him to engage historically with the fragmented character of ancient 
philosophy as understood as a training in a way of life.31 Constantine Fasolt takes 
up Wittgenstein’s approach to a way or form of life in his essay History, Law, and 
Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion in the History of Law.32 The substantive 
point of departure of his essay is “the history of law [and thus the legal historian] 
furnishes a kind of knowledge that is essential for maintaining justice.”33 His 
concern is that without the writing of good legal history, law would be left to the 
dead or to tyrants. One reading of Fasolt’s essay is that it provides a philosophical 
grounding of the writing of legal history by explaining how law, language, 
 
27. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS (Daniel Breazeale ed., R.J. Hollingdale 
trans., 1997). 
28. See also Ian Hunter, The Mythos, Ethos, and Pathos of the Humanities, 40 HIST. EUROPEAN IDEAS 
11, 18–23 (2013). 
29. Marianne Constable also makes this point in working through her account of law as 
language. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (2014); 
Marianne Constable, Speaking Imperfectly: Law, Language, and History, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 349, 361 
(2015). 
30. See generally Hunter, supra note 28. 
31. HADOT, supra note 23, at 132–35; Pierre Force, Teeth of Time: Pierre Hadot on Meaning and 
Misunderstanding in the History of Ideas, 50 HIST. & THEORY 20 (2011), available at http://hdl.handle.net/
10022/AC:P:11190. 
32. Constantin Fasolt, History, Law, and Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion in the 
History of Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 413, 418–438 (2015). 
33. Id. at 418. 
McVeigh_production read v4 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:40 PM 
506 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:499 
judgement, and justice are intertwined. Another, not so different reading, is that 
Fasolt, like Hadot, treats Wittgenstein as providing a philosophical training in a way 
of life. Fasolt turns Wittgenstein’s teaching or training to the development of the 
persona of the historian. 
Fasolt’s argument is shaped by how to understand meaning: judgement, 
agreement, and the relation between language and reality.34 This is considered 
through Wittgenstein’s formula: “It is not only agreement in definitions, but also 
(odd as it may sound) agreement in judgements that is required for communication 
by means of language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.”35 
While this formulation can be treated as part of Wittgenstein’s inquiry into 
meaning, it can also be treated as a “spiritual exercise” designed to maintain a proper 
relation to language and, it might be imagined, to those with whom communication 
is sought. It is agreement in language that gives us a form of life. Whether such 
agreements in language are formulated as techniques of transcendence or not is a 
matter of historical investigation. 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings, Michael McGhee has argued, should be 
thought of as a series of exercises aimed at allowing for the cultivation of a certain 
“coolness” or self-possession (sōphrosunē) which might also be a way of describing 
Fasolt’s ambition for the persona of the legal historian.36 The ability to draw 
distinctions between knowing what people were saying and what they were doing 
in the past requires judgement and forms of political community. The office of 
historian, asserts Fasolt, requires us to say something about the past and claim that 
it is true.37 The specific obligation of the legal historian is to judge the dead in 
relation to a law, which itself passes judgement on that which is just and unjust. 
Legal historians also have to take responsibility for such judgements. A failure to do 
this adequately is a failure of office and an injustice. The training the Fasolt has 
briefly drawn from Wittgenstein, then, is in part one engaged in the formation of a 
self; it is necessary to cultivate a philosophical coolness. It is, in part, a cultivation 
of the persona of the legal historian as someone who is able to judge (with courage) 
and, in part, an ordering of the office of legal historian as concerned with relations 
of law, justice, and political community.38 
 
34. Id. at 425. 
35. Id. at 423 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN 
[PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS], at xiv (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. 
Anscombe et al. trans., Wiley-Blackwell 4th ed. 2009) (1953)). 
36. Michael McGhee, Wittgenstein’s Temple: Or How Cool is Philosophy?, in PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY 
OF LIFE: ANCIENTS AND MODERNS–ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PIERRE HADOT 241 (Michael Chase et al. 
eds., 2013). 
37. Fasolt, supra note 32, at 457. 
38. The sense in which such formulations belong to metaphysical tradition is hard to assess. See 
JOHN W. COOK, WITTGENSTEIN’S METAPHYSICS (1994). Fasolt draws his account in that direction by 
tying his consideration of office to Aristotle’s account of polity. 
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IV. PREPARATION 
The accounts offered above all draw on traditions of European metaphysics 
in order to formulate their accounts of the cultivation of the persona of philosopher, 
historian, and jurisprudent. Such philosophical, historical, and jurisprudential 
projects themselves can be written about in terms of intellectual, political, 
jurisprudential, and social histories. While metaphysics as first philosophy often 
carries within it a claim to form beyond history, Pierre Hadot has convincingly 
shown that a history can be written of how to accede to, or succeed in living, a 
philosophical or lawful life. 
In “‘Law As . . .’ II, History As Interface for the interdisciplinary Study of 
Law,” Jeffrey Minson’s account of the dignity of the civil state explicitly links the 
cultivation of a persona for public life to office-based accounts of civil state and the 
cultivation of a number of desacralised personae.39 In doing so, he draws attention 
to the sorts of training in conduct offered through the rhetorical traditions of 
training in public life. These skills are put to work in occupying the offices of the 
modern state, including that of the University.40 As matter of political and moral 
thought, some of these realities relate to the conditions of civil peace and 
commonwealth and others to the sorts of moral anthropology that might be 
appropriate to a civil prudence. Minson organises his moral anthropology around 
human fallibility and imperfection. In such accounts, sociality might be viewed as 
the realisation of human imperfection rather than the quest for perfection.41 The 
concern of the state is not to perfect human life but to govern the conduct of 
citizens in matters of civil order. Minson’s account of living with the state 
emphasises both the plurality of offices that are occupied by a person at any one 
time (artist, citizen, employee, friend, householder, jurist, jurisprudent, orator, 
philosopher, and so forth) and the different forms of ethical and rhetorical 
conduct—the two are linked—appropriate to each. In this account, the cultivation 
of personae is a plural activity that accepts, as did Weber, that people require plural 
personae, both within and without office, as they go about their business of 
engaging in the world.42 The object of a civil prudence might be to enliven the 
persona available to those who occupy office rather than a training in formation of 
a unified persona fit for transcendence. 
The training in conduct presented in Bonnie Honig’s article The Laws of the 
Sabbath (Poetry): Arendt, Heine and the Politics of Debt is somewhat different.43 Like 
Minson, Honig is concerned with the conduct of life, and both take the view that 
ethical and rhetorical performance are closely linked. Whereas Minson’s repertoires 
 
39. Jeffrey Minson, How to Speak Well of the State: A Rhetoric of Civil Prudence, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 437, 440 (2014). 
40. MINSON, supra note 18, at 3–15. 
41. Minson, supra note 39, at 452. 
42. Id. 
43. Bonnie Honig, The Laws of the Sabbath (Poetry): Arendt, Heine, and the Politics of Debt, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 463 (2015). 
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of conduct are addressed to thinking creatively within office, Honig seeks to 
establish the repertoires of resilience and preparation for political life, which include 
modes of “rebellion, poetry, Sabbath-power, rights-claiming, and mockery of [those 
very same] powers.”44 In so doing, she writes of the exemplary figure of the 
“pariah.” The transformations Honig has to hand are extreme: that from the “dog 
with dog’s ideas” to a “man with man’s emotions.”45 The power of transformation 
is affected by the Sabbath and, by analogy, forms of strike such as the loan strike.46 
Rather than follow the detail of Honig’s argument, I want to touch on the 
training in conduct that is presented. Much of this essay is written in relation to 
Hannah Arendt’s essay The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition. Honig suggests that 
Arendt misses something of what is interesting in Heine’s poetry by focusing so 
forcefully on “a standard of action or pariah consciousness.”47 Honig instead looks 
at the preparation: the Sabbath in not a place of passive inactivity; it is the ceremony 
and ritual of the Sabbath that enables the dogs to become humans. The Sabbath is 
a state of exception where all divisions disappear through the intensification of 
everyday life rather than its interruption. This intensification of the everyday is in 
part a teaching of resilience.48 
To explain the intensification of everyday, Honig turns to the work of the 
psychoanalyst, Donald Winnicott and his understanding of how babies relate to and 
use objects (especially mothers). In Winnicott’s account, it is through object use that 
it is possible to learn mastery and come to understand permanence of objects.49 The 
use is that of destruction and the lesson that of love (the object survives to be loved 
(or not)) and/or autonomy (the object is destroyed and the baby learns autonomy 
(or not)). The lesson Honig draws from this ties preparation and play to the fantasy 
and permanence of objects. Transitional objects, Sabbath events or public things, 
establish places from which resilience can be learnt. (Although Honig writes here 
about the resilience of the self and persona of the conscious pariah (in the hidden 
tradition), this might also be one way of thinking about the training in the conduct 
of lawful relations within the common law tradition.) 
V. JURISPRUDENCE AND HISTORY WRITING 
As Chris Tomlins has noted, a significant part of the work of the “‘Law As . . .’ 
III” symposium has been conducted in the shadow of the relation between 
jurisprudence and history writing. This topic could also be viewed as the central 
topic of several traditions of philosophy, law, and history. All accounts of 
 
44. Id. at 481. 
45. Id. at 469. 
46. For another jurisprudence that considers metamorphosis and shape shifting as a matter of 
the actualisation of Law, see C.F. BLACK, THE LAND IS THE SOURCE OF THE LAW: A DIALOGIC 
ENCOUNTER WITH INDIGENOUS JURISPRUDENCE (2011). 
47. Honig, supra note 43, at 481. 
48. Id.; see also Bonnie Honig, The Politics of Public Things: Neoliberalism and the Routine of Privatization, 
10 NO FOUND. 59 (2013). 
49. D.W. WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND REALITY 86–94 (1971). 
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historiography and jurisprudence, no doubt, have their ways of personifying and 
training the jurisprudent and historian, although whether or not such persona are 
met in the figure of the legal historian is an open question. The final engagement 
here with conduct of office will be restricted to two brief comments: the first relates 
to the difficulties of thinking across genres of jurisprudence and history, and the 
second addresses some of the welcome limits of jurisprudence and history. One 
feature that is striking about the contributions to the “Law As . . .” symposia is their 
easy eclecticism and the sense that the formation of a persona and the 
transformation of law are to be related. These concerns might be gathered under 
the heading of judgement of office: the consideration of the virtues and vices of 
office, the means and ends of conduct, and the character of the scholar and the 
minor jurisprudent (and legal historian). 
In many ways, Kunal Parker’s essay Law ‘In’ and ‘As’ History: The Common Law 
in the American Polity, 1790–1900 provides a counterpoint to redemptive or 
transcendental histories of law by addressing the exhaustion of contextualist 
historiography.50 For Parker, disputes about “contextualist” history and internal and 
external accounts of history themselves have a history, which is usually told from a 
modernist position of the ascendancy of contextualist, antifoundationalist history 
writing. In this essay, he examines the historiography of the common law tradition 
prior to the period when contextual or external history became predominant (O.W. 
Holmes is treated as the exemplary jurist-philosopher-historian). In Parker’s 
analysis, the histories of common law thought written by people within the common 
law tradition are far from contextual; they have purpose and direction and do 
dissipate into context. This, for Parker, is not so much the problem of knowledge 
and method but of treating the practice of history writing as a form of conduct. 
In Parker’s account, the common law thinkers of the early nineteenth century 
were happy to work both within a common law account of legal form as existing 
from “time immemorial,” and as well contributing to foundational and teleological 
histories of law. It is not the case that the modern contextualist historians do not 
notice or write of such forms of temporality (Parker has). It is more that the 
historiography of critically inclined contextual legal historians (and the training 
provided to meet and sustain such accounts) generally addresses different problems 
to those that confronted legal historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.51 The anti-metaphysical and anti-sectarian aspects of modern contextual 
history writing require historical contextualisation (rather than, say, philosophical 
recuperation). More importantly for Parker, it is, in part, the writing of histories of 
the common law that hold on to an “internal” account of law that also provides a 
 
50. Kunal M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 1790– 
1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587 (2011); see also Kunal M. Parker, Repetition in History: Anglo-American 
Legal Debates and the Writings of Walter Bagehot, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 121 (2014). 
51. David S. Caudill, Law, Science, and the Economy: One Domain?, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 393, 402 
(2015); see also BRUNO LATOUR, AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
THE MODERNS (Catherine Porter trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (2012). 
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point of engagement with the politics of law as a question of the conduct of 
research.52 
The second set of examples points briefly to the ways certain historical 
practices are treated as making visible the virtues of the office of the legal historian. 
At issue is not methodology as such, but the maintenance of a relation between the 
technology or craft of history writing and conduct of office. A list of these might 
include aide memoires on the repertoires of history writing: make visible the 
conduct and conflicts of law; examine and write histories of law with the recognition 
that there is more than one law;53 establish relations of authority and inheritance of 
legal forms;54 attend to the times of law;55 address the subjectivity of scale;56 
maintain a relationship between history writing and historiography, jurisprudence 
writing and jurisography;57 engage the state rhetorically not theologically;58 or, more 
simply, maintain the tools of your science. Treated as methodological statements, 
there is not much to say (except perhaps to apologise to a number of scholars for 
presenting a travesty of their scholarship). However, as Pierre Hadot has noted, the 
fragmentary form of such points of advice, reflection, and exercises provides the 
focal points for the consideration of the conduct of office.59 
CONCLUSION 
In writing about the contributors to “Law As . . .” as participating, if only 
briefly, in the office of minor jurisprudent, I have given emphasis to reporting forms 
of training in conduct, rather than provide a critical reflection or forms of 
disciplinary critique. In part, this reflects the genre of the afterword: reporting 
 
52. See also Shai J. Lavi, Humane Killing and the Ethics of the Secular: Regulating the Death Penalty, 
Euthanasia, and Animal Slaughter, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297 (2014). Like Parker, Lavi questions our 
contemporary understanding of our legal system (those who live within a common law tradition) and 
reconsiders the ways in which “secularization” is understood. Id. at 315–16. Lavi argues that suffering 
pain has become meaningless in the secular ordering of life. Id. at 319. At the same time, however, the 
painless death has become a source of meaning and emblem of modern bloodless sacred killing or 
better a bloodless emblem of what was once sacred killing. Id. at 323. For Lavi, one task of the historian 
is to maintain the visibility of this relation. 
53. Susan Bibler Coutin et al., Routine Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the 
Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97 (2014). 
54. Michelle A. McKinley, Standing on Shaky Ground: Criminal Jurisdiction and Ecclesiastical Immunity 
in Seventeenth-Century Lima, 1600–1700, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 141 (2014) (joining histories of slavery in 
Peru to practices of record keeping and care of archive); see also Prabha Kotiswaran, Beyond Sexual 
Humanitarianism: A Postcolonial Approach to Anti-Trafficking Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 353 (2014) 
(treating labor and migration regulation as framing forms of lives of sex workers). 
55. Renisa Mawani, Law As Temporality: Colonial Politics and Indian Settlers, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
65 (2014) (re-configuring rival temporalities of law: time as a technique of government, history writing). 
56. Kotiswaran, supra note 54, at 379–80; Mariana Valverde, The Rescaling of Feminist Analyses of 
Law and State Power: From (Domestic) Subjectivity to (Transnational) Governance Networks, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 325 (2014). 
57. Bernadette Meyler, Law, Literature, and History: The Love Triangle, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 365 
(2015). 
58. Brook Thomas, Reconstructing the Limits of Schmitt’s Theory of Sovereignty: A Case for Law As 
Rhetoric, Not As Political Theology, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 239 (2014). 
59. HADOT, supra note 23, at 191–95. 
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provides a way of engaging materials as part of a practical activity of training in 
conduct without forcing too much unity on the sorts of projects that have appeared 
in the “Law As . . .” symposia. In part, it offers a way of limiting the question of 
training in the conduct of living with law to a limited range of concerns with the 
“government of the tongue.” The office of minor jurisprudent that emerges is still, 
no doubt, housed within the university; the various styles of training in conduct of 
office do, in significant ways, require the formation of a self and the cultivation of 
a persona that address concerns apart from office. 
The Afterword presented here has taken its cue from the provocation of 
conducts of life in terms of glossolalia. The engagement with glossolalia within 
church traditions has rarely been uncontested. For the Christian protestant 
Pentecostal churches, speaking in tongues takes on the signs of the presence and 
gift of the Holy Spirit. For Saint Paul, the concerns with glossolalia and Holy Spirit 
merge with concerns about the translation of the true spirit in tongues and of false 
possession.60 In the “Law As . . .” symposia, the concern with the spirit of the law 
has been more with the enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment of 
jurisprudence through the practices of history writing and the recasting of the 
concerns of lawful life. 
If the office of the minor jurisprudent has duties in relation to the 
“government of the tongue,” however, it is not so much the direct expression of 
the spirit of law or justice, but one divided or split between the intervention in the 
present by asking questions of the past and the setting of the scene for “new laws.” 
The offices of jurisprudent clearly establish a broad range of duties and few of the 
personae taken up by anthropologists, jurisprudents, historians, rhetoricians, 
philosophers, and political economists who care for the conduct of lawful relations 
would find commonality only in a single persona or way of life. For this reason, I 
have proceeded by emphasising both the plurality of personae of office and the 
forms of exercise and training undertaken in their formation. However, to leave a 
symposium or three symposia only in this way is also a neglect of office, since a 
symposium enacts, as it should, another obligation of the scholar: the conduct of 
intellectual friendship.  
 
60. KIRSOPP LAKE, THE EARLIER EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL: THEIR MOTIVE AND ORIGIN 204, 
244 (1911). 
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